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Equal Protection-ScHooL FINANCING SYSTEM BASED ON LOcAL. PROPERTY
TAXES

HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL-LSerrao

v. Priest

The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution allows unequal protection of the laws, provided such unequal treatment and discrimination bear some rational relationship to a conceivably legitimate state objective.1 This "rational relationship" test allows the states wide latitude and
discretion in enacting legislation. However, where any state statute involves so-called "suspect classifications" or "fundamental interests," the
statute will be subjected to a strict scrutiny test, under which the state must
establish that there is not only a compelling state interest which justifies the
law but also that the distinctions drawn in the statute are necessary to
2
further such interests.
In the recent decision of Serrano v. Priest,3 the California Supreme Court
found that a statute establishing a school financing system, based primarily
on local property taxes and resulting in substantial disparities among individual school districts in the amount of revenue available per pupil, 4 was
1

See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Kotch v. Board of River Port
Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947); Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 US.
580 (1935); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911); Atchison, T. &
v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96 (1899).
S.F.R.R.
2
See Villiams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Kramer
v. Union School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S.
802 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942); Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,82 HARV. L. Rrv. 1065,
1087-1130 (1969).
35 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
4Id. at 592-95, 600, 487 P.2d at 1246-48, 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 606-08, 612. Figures
analyzed by the court showed the following:
(1) 55.7 per cent of California's educational revenues for the fiscal year 1968-69
came from local property taxes.
(2) The assessed valuation of real property per pupil (actually, per unit of average
daily attendance) varied between districts from $103 to $952,156 in 1969-70.
(3) Each district received "basic state aid" consisting of $125 per pupil per year, regardless of its relative wealth.
(4) Through "equalization aids," each school district is guaranteed $355 for each
elementary school pupil and $488 for each high school student. The aid is computed
by adding $125 (the basic aid) to a hypothetical amount which would be generated
if each district levied a property tax at a rate of $1 on each assessed $100 (800 per
$100 in high school districts) and then taking the difference, if any, between that total
and the guaranteed amount.
(5) Even with such aid, expenditures during 1969-70 varied from $407 per pupil to
$2586 per pupil.
(6) Poorer districts, taxing at three times the rate of wealthier ones, were still
spending only one third as much per pupil.
[441]
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drawn on the basis of wealth, a suspect classification, and affected education,
a fundamental interest. The court therefore applied the strict scrutiny test
and found that the financing system was not necessary to accomplish the
state objective 5 and was thus violative of the fourteenth amendment. 6
The correctness of the court's decision depends on whether the strict
scrutiny approach was the proper test, and if so, whether it was properly
applied. It is therefore necessary to determine 1) whether the classifications
according to school districts are "suspect" because they result in districts
of differing wealth, and 2) whether education is a "fundamental interest."
The United States Supreme Court has held that classifications which result in wealth discrimination are traditionally disfavored.7 The Court, in
recent dictum, has also stated that wealth, like race, is a factor which would
independently render a classification suspect and demand the more exacting
strict scrutiny test.8 However, in all cases in which a wealth classification has
been involved and a statute held violative of the fourteenth amendment, a"
fundamental interest has also been present. 9 This has occasioned some debate
as to whether a wealth classification alone would demand the more-rigid
test.10 While the Supreme Court has held that the right to vote, a fundamental
interest; may not be based on the payment of a tax (i.e.' wealth)," it is
common knowledge that other "rights" (such as driving), not fundamental,
ai6 conditioned on the payment of a fee. The Serrano court impliedly recognized this difficulty and based its decision on the combination of a wealth
classification and a fundamental interest. 12
5 Id. at 589, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604. The state objective cited was local
responsibility for control of the schools. Conceding that this might be a compelling
state interest, the court nevertheless correctly noted that the present financing system
was not a necessary element in encouraging local responsibility. The court obviously
applied the strict scrutiny test properly. Id. at 610, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
620.
GThe court also held that the financing scheme violated article I, sections 11 and 21,
of the California constitution. Id. at 596 n.11, 487 P.2d at 1249 n.11, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
609 n.11. Thus, regardless of whether such a scheme violated the fourteenth amendment,
it was invalid in California under the state constitution.
7See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
8 McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969).
9See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (criminal rights); Williams v. Illinois, 399
U.S. 235' (1970) (criminal rights); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right
of travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (criminal rights); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956) (criminal rights).
10 See Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. Rav. 7 (1969).
11 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
12 Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 604, 614, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255, 1262-63, 96 Cal. Rptr.
601, 615, 622-23 (1971).
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The defendants primary argument with respect to wealth was that the.
classifications according to school districts amounted to only an indirect,
unintentional, and therefore de facto, wealth classification. By analogy to
the school desegration cases, they argued that a de facto distinction was permissible.' 3 The California Court felt that the classification was de jure because of the state action involved, 14 but this conclusion is certainly questionable because the wealth classification was merely an indirect and unintentional result of the statute. 15 However, even if the classification were conceded to be de facto, the defendants' argument should not prevail. Invalid
wealth classifications, in combination with a fundamental interest, have been
found to exist when the classifications were neither intentionally nor directly
made on the basis of wealth.' 6
Thus, the key to the holding in Serrano is the court's finding that education is a "fundamental interest." This is an extension of the law since heretofore the United States Supreme Court has found only voting,'7 travel,' 8
.procreation, 9 and certain criminal rights 20 to be fundamental. Unfortunately,
the Court has not articulated a general test to distinguish fundamental interests from other interests for the purpose of equal protection. One case
13 It should be noted, however, that the California Supreme Court has also held de
facto racial segregation invalid. See San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson,
3 Cal. 3d 937, 479 P.2d 669, 92 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1971); Jackson v. Pasadena City School
Dist, 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1963). Thus, no analogy to de
facto racial segregation is possible in California.
14Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 603, 487 P.2d 1241, 1254, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 614
(1971).
15
1t is generally agreed, with respect to racial segregation, that the discrimination
must be intentional to be de jure. See generally Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 780 (1967).
Serrano admitted that this wealtb classification was not alleged to be intentional or
purposeful. Serrano -v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 601, 487 P.2d 1241, 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601;
612 (1971).
16See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (direct but unintentional); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (indirect and unintentional); Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (indirect and unintentional). Note that the result in
Serrano is to classify education as fundamental, and to hold invalid a de facto wealth
classification affecting education. Such a decision may have implications for the
school desegregation cases which involve de facto race classifications affecting education.
17 See Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 52 (1969) (Brennan, J, dissenting); Cipriano v. City
of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969);
McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23 (1968); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
18 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
19 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
2
OSee Tate v. Short, 401 U.. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Grifflft v. Illinois, 351U.S. 12 (1956).
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seems to suggest that an interest, to be fundamental, must be a right guaranteed by the Constitution. 21 If this is the test, education probably would
not qualify, unless the fourteenth amendment makes it a right which must
22
be made available to all on equal terms.

However, most of the cases seem to classify an interest as fundamental
because of its extreme importance, or as one writer has suggested, because
of the severity of the detriment imposed on persons who are discriminated

against. 23 Thus, voting was classified as fundamental because it is preservative
of other basic civil and political rights, 24 and procreation was said to be

fundamental to the very existence and survival of the human race. 25 In this
respect, education compares quite favorably with the other fundamental
interests. At a minimum it makes more meaningful the casting of a ballot.
Education is the single most important factor in the economic status achieved
by most persons. It affects directly a greater number of persons than does
criminal law and probably aids in reducing the crime rate. It also supports
other values of a democratic society, such as participation, communication,
26
and social mobility.

Finally, numerous cases have stressed the importance and necessity of

education in our society. 27 And, as the Serrano court noted, education lasts

for a lengthy period of time, is essential in maintaining free enterprise
democracy, is universally relevant, and is important enough to be made
compulsory.28 The arguments, then, for treating education as fundamental
because of its great importance in American life are obviously substantial. 29
21Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-34 (1969) (Court applied strict scrutiny
test after noting that travel was a right guaranteed by the Constitution).
22See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Opportunity for education "is
a right which must be made available to all on equal terms." Id. at 493 (emphasis added).
23 82 HARv. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1130.
2
4 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370
(1886).
25 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541

(1942).
26 For a general discussion of the importance of education as compared with voting

and criminal rights, see Coons, Clune, & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A
Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 305,
361-69
(1969).
27
See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 221 (1971); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1954); Hargrave v. McKinney, 413 F.2d 320, 324 (5th Cir. 1969),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Askew v. Hargrave, 401 US. 476 (1971); Hobson v.
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d
175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
28

Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 609-10, 487 P.2d 1241, 1258-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601,

618-19 (1971).
29

Serrano and the other authorities have addressed themselves to public elementary
and secondary education. Whether the same arguments would apply to public higher
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Since a fundamental interest alone is sufficient to justify the application of
the strict scrutiny test,3 0 and additionally noting that a wealth classification
is present, the decision of the Serrano court has considerable merit.
One of the principal arguments of the defendants in Serrano was that the
United States Constitution does not require equal per pupil expenditures or
that expenditures be made only on the basis of educational needs. 31 However, Serrano did not hold that such expenditures are required. The court
merely held invalid a financing system which relies heavily on local property
taxes and results in substantial disparities among school districts in the
amount of revenue available per pupil.32 Presumably, the court would be
satisfied if each school district had the same amount of assessable property
or worked from the same tax base. Nothing in Serrano would prevent each
district from taxing at its own rate or from spending the revenue as it saw
fit.33

The primary reason for the California appellate court's rejection of the
plaintiff's claims was its belief that the United States Supreme Court had foreclosed any consideration of the matter3 4 by its summary affirmance of
Burruss v. Wilkerson 5 and Mclnnis v. Shapiro.3 6 Both cases involved attacks on public school financing systems similar to California's; both cases
concluded that such systems were constitutional. In Burruss, the court
merely stated that there was no discrimination by the state and that the
financing plan was uniform and consistent.3 7 No consideration was given to
education is questionable, but at least arguable considering our present society and the
emphasis placed on a college degree.
30 See note 2 supra.
3
1See Serrano v. Priest, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 1117, 89 Cal. Rptr. 345, 350 (1970) (De-

cision of court of appeal affirming trial court's judgment in sustaining demurrer to
plaintiff's complaint. Justice McComb based his dissent in Serrano on this opinion by
Justice Dunn).
32

Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 589, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 604 (1971).

The court stated that the funding scheme invidiously discriminated against the poor
because it made the quality of a child's education a function of the wealth of his parents
and neighbors. It never stated that the funding scheme was invalid because it failed
to guarantee equal per pupil expenditures throughout California.
33
See Coons, Clune, & Sugarman, supra note 24, at 338. The authors call such a
plan a power equalized district system because districts that taxed at the same rate
would spend the same amount per pupil. However, not all persons believe that such
a plan would satisfy the fourteenth amendment. Some think that equal per pupil expenditures would generally be required. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 10, at 47-59.
34Serrano v. Priest, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 1114-17, 89 Cal. Rptr. 345, 348-50 (1970).
35 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd, 397 U.S. 44 (1970).
36293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. 1l. 1968), aff'd sub nor. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322
(1969).
37 Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572, 574 (W.D. Va. 1969). The court did express
sympathy for the plaintiffs, citing their aim as commendable and praying that the
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any of the issues raised in Serrano. The McInnis court did apply the traditional rational relationship test but did not deal with the possibilities of
wealth as a suspect classification or education as a fundamental interest.38
The plaintiffs in that case contended that a financing system must apportion
funds according to the educational needs of students. The court's holding
was essentially based on the fact that "educational needs" is a nebulous
concept, rendering the issue nonjusticiable. 39 Since neither Burruss nor
Mclnnis dealt with the issues raised in Serrano, the California Supreme Court
could reasonably decide that it was not foreclosed from considering the
matters raised. Furthermore, in the recent decision of Askew v. Hargrave4D
the United States Supreme Court indicated that it had not foreclosed the
possibility of equal protection applicability to school financing schemes.4'
Since Serrano, federal courts in two states have invalidated school financing plans similar to California's. 42 Hopefully, this trend will continue and
its weight will influence the ultimate decision of the United States Supreme
Court. Education forms the very foundation of any viable society. The opportunity for a quality education 43 should be as even-handedly distributed
General Assembly would come to their aid. Virginia's state financing system for public
education is rather similar to California's. See Va. Acts of Assembly 1970, ch. 461, at 681.
38
Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 332 (N.D. II. 1968).
39 Id. at 335-36.
40401 U.S. 476 (1971). A three-judge court held unconstitutional a Florida statute
which limited the local property tax rate that a county could levy in raising school
revenue. Having invalidated the statute under the traditional equal protection test, the
court declined to consider plaintiff's contention that education was a fundamental
interest requiring application of the strict scrutiny test. Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp.
944 (M.D. Fla. 1970). The Supreme Court reversed the decision on other grounds, but
indicated that the district court should thoroughly explore the equal protection issue
on remand.
41 The defendants also argued in line with a number of cases (see note 1, supra)
that territorial uniformity is not generally required of legislation and should not be
necessary in school financing. However, since those cases relied upon by defendants
involved neither fundamental interests nor suspect classifications, the lack of territorial
uniformity had to satisfy only the traditional test and not the strict scrutiny test. The
school financing scheme in Serrano probably would have satisfied the former test also.
42
Rodriquez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., - F. Supp. - (W.D. Tex.
1971); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971).
43 The whole decision, of course, depends on the existence of a causal connection
between money spent per pupil and the quality of education. Serrano notes that this
is a matter for proof, but seems inclined to believe that there is such a connection.
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 601, 487 P.2d 1241, 1253, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 613 (1971).
It should be noted that even the McInnis court felt that the amount of money spent
affected the quality of education. McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 331 (W.D. ILl.
1968).-
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as possible. The -Serrano decision demanded this even-handed treatment
when it defined education in terms of what it must be in modem societya "fundamental interest."
J.W.T.

